UnifiedSecurityOperations,Next-GenIntelligence&Forensics
Real-time threat detection across every asset, AI-driven threat correlation that connects weak signals into confirmed intrusions, and automated DFIR that reconstructs the full attack timeline in minutes, not weeks.
- Events / day
- Correlation accuracy
- Mean time to triage
// The Vision
One operating system for defense
Three specialised platforms, one shared telemetry spine. Detection, intel and forensics stop being separate tools and start being a single loop.
Unified SOC Monitoring
Every agent, endpoint, cloud workload and network segment funnels into one correlated event plane with MITRE ATT&CK mapping applied at ingest.
Autonomous Threat Hunting
Continuous attack-surface discovery and threat-intel enrichment hunt for exposure before an adversary does — no analyst query required.
Rapid Forensic Reconstruction
Automated evidence collection stitches process, credential and lateral-movement artifacts into a defensible incident timeline.
// The Ecosystem
Three platforms, one defense loop
Detection, intelligence and forensics stop being separate tools and start being a single, self-reinforcing loop across your entire security operation.
SpyraSOC
Enterprise-Grade Security Event Monitoring
Real-time alert evolution across every asset, MITRE ATT&CK mapping at ingest, AI-driven threat correlation that turns weak signals into confirmed intrusions — all from one unified event plane.
- Real-time alert correlation across 12.4B+ daily events
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping applied at ingest
- Multi-agent stacked alert evolution tracking
- Asset inventory with live risk scoring
Alert Level Evolution
Top MITRE ATT&CKs
Alerts Evolution — Top 5 Agents
SpyraIntel
Continuous Threat Intelligence & Exposure Tracking
Continuous vulnerability exposure tracking, real-time threat correlation, and automated threat actor profiling. Know your attack surface before adversaries do.
- Automated attack surface discovery
- Threat intel enrichment with actor profiling
- Risk score breakdown across 48+ categories
- Continuous exposure monitoring with live feeds
Threat Actor Country & Sector Distribution
Top targeted countries, broken down by targeted sector
Tactic Coverage
TTP volume per ATT&CK tactic, across all listed actors
Top Techniques
Most common MITRE techniques (top 10)
Actor Details
22 documented actors matched against this scan's profile
SpyraDFIR
Timeline Reconstruction & Automated DFIR
Automated evidence collection stitches process, credential and lateral-movement artifacts into a defensible incident timeline — reconstructing the full attack chain in minutes, not weeks.
- Automated forensic timeline reconstruction
- Lateral movement and credential tracking
- Incident containment playbooks
- Root-cause analysis with confidence scoring
GlobalTech Industries suffered a targeted intrusion beginning May 15 2026 via a spear-phishing email carrying a malicious Excel macro. The macro spawned a PowerShell stager that downloaded and executed a Cobalt Strike beacon (svchost32.exe), establishing C2 to 185.220.101.47. The attacker moved laterally to the domain controller (DC01) using PsExec, executed Mimikatz to dump domain administrator credentials, then spread to the file server (FS01) and web server (WEB01).
Approximately 2.3 GB of files were staged and a partial HTTPS exfiltration to the C2 succeeded on May 18. A ransomware payload (encrypt.exe) was deployed on May 19 but blocked by the EDR on all three targets. No evidence of ransomware execution was found. Incident containment actions are in progress.
On the morning of May 15 2026, a threat actor began probing GlobalTech's internet-facing web server, exploiting two unpatched vulnerabilities to gain an initial foothold. Less than an hour later, an employee in the finance department opened what appeared to be a routine vendor invoice emailed that morning. The attachment was malicious: opening it quietly launched hidden software that reached out to the attacker's server on the internet and installed a remote-control program on the employee's computer.
Over the next day the attacker used that foothold to move deeper into the network. They stole the passwords of several powerful administrator accounts directly from the domain controller's memory, then used those credentials to spread to the file server and a second server. Shortly after seizing administrative control, the attacker deliberately erased the security logs on the domain controller and switched off the company's security monitoring software — going dark for roughly sixteen hours to hide what they did next.
On May 17 the attacker gathered sensitive files from the finance share, compressed them into a password-protected archive, and the following night attempted to smuggle the data out. A first attempt was blocked by the firewall, but a second route succeeded and roughly 847 MB of finance data left the network before the connection was cut off.
Finally, on May 19, the attacker tried to deploy ransomware across three servers to encrypt the company's files. The endpoint security software detected and stopped the ransomware within seconds on every machine, so no files were encrypted. The investigation is ongoing.
- 1. Initial Access (T1566.001) — May 15 09:14: Spear-phishing email delivered to jsmith@globaltech.com.
- 2. Execution (T1204.002 / T1059.001) — May 15 09:48: Excel macro executed, spawning powershell.exe.
- 3. C2 Deployment (T1105 / T1071.001) — May 15 09:49–09:51: Cobalt Strike beacon to 185.220.101.47:443.
- 4. Persistence (T1053.005) — May 15 10:15: Scheduled task 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' created.
- 5. Process Injection (T1055) — May 15 10:45: Beacon injected into legitimate svchost.exe.
- 6. Discovery (T1016 / T1018) — May 15 11:30: nltest + net user /domain enumeration.
- 7. Lateral Movement to DC01 (T1021.002) — May 16 08:22: PsExec to DC01.
- 8. Credential Dumping (T1003.001) — May 16 08:45: Mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords on DC01.
- 9. Lateral Movement to FS01 + WEB01 (T1021.002) — May 16 10:00:
- 10. Collection & Staging (T1560.001) — May 17 14:30–15:45: 2.3 GB archived to data.7z.
- 11. Exfiltration (T1048.002) — May 18 02:31: HTTPS exfiltration ~847 MB.
- 12. Impact Attempt (T1486) — May 19 22:15–22:17: Ransomware detected and quarantined by EDR.
Active Cobalt Strike C2 Beacon — Persistent Backdoor
A Cobalt Strike stager (svchost32.exe, SHA-256: 3ba4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4b) was executed on WKSTN-JSMITH and injected into svchost.exe. The implant maintained HTTPS C2 to 185.220.101.47:443 (cobaltkit.xyz) from May 15 ...
confirmed-maliciousDomain Administrator Credentials Compromised via Mimikatz
Mimikatz (SHA-256: a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2) was executed interactively on DC01 under the Cobalt Strike beacon session. The sekurlsa::logonpasswords module dumped NTLM hashes and cleartext credentials for 3 domain ...
confirmed-maliciousInternet-Facing WEB01 Exploited via CVE-2021-41773 + CVE-2021-44228 (Both in CISA KEV)
WEB01 was exploited via two unpatched CVEs before the phishing email was even opened. At 08:30 the attacker used CVE-2021-41773 (Apache httpd 2.4.49 path traversal / unauthenticated RCE via mod_cgi; CVSS 9.8) to spawn cmd.exe and download a secondary Cobalt Str...
confirmed-maliciousSpear-Phishing Email — Initial Access via Malicious Excel Macro
A spear-phishing email was delivered to jsmith@globaltech.com on May 15 09:14 with subject 'Q1-2026 Invoice — Action Required'. The attachment 'Q1-2026-Invoice.xlsm' contained an obfuscated VBA macro that bypassed the Mark-of-the-Web prompt. The macro execut...
confirmed-maliciousLateral Movement via PsExec to DC01, FS01, and WEB01
PsExec (Sysinternals) was used from WKSTN-JSMITH to execute remote commands on three internal targets. DC01 was accessed May 16 08:22 using the initially compromised account credentials; FS01 and WEB01 were accessed May 16 10:00–10:05 using domain admin cred...
confirmed-maliciousOperators who've been in the arena
We build what we needed when we were on the other side of the alert — tools that actually help during a breach, not after.
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